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Holden Caulfield Grows Up: Salinger v.
Colting, the Promotion-of-Progress
Requirement, and Market Failure
in a Derivative-Works Regime
John M. Newman*
ABSTRACT: In 2009, the pseudonymous 'John David California"
announced plans for U.S. publication of 6o Years Later: Coming
Through the Rye, a "sequel" to JD. Salinger's canonical novel The
Catcher in the Rye. Salinger reacted swiftly, bringing a copyrightinfingement suit to enjoin publication of the new work. The district court
granted the injunction, effectively banning U.S. distribution of the sequel
and unintentionally illustrating modern copyright law's troubling
divergence from the purpose of the constitutional grant of copyright
authority to Congress.
Economic analysis demonstrates the tension caused by the repeated,
incremental expansion of copyright protections-at some point, the
Copyright Act will fail to incentivize the net dissemination of new works. A
check on congressional authority is needed. While a multitude of scholars
have advocatedfor the First Amendment to serve as such, this Note proposes
that the "promotion-ofpprogress" requirement of Article I, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitutionprovides a superior alternativeto direct FirstAmendment
scrutiny. Thus, where the Copyright Act fails to encourage artisticoutputand, as applied to situations like Salinger v. Colting, it almost certainly
does-the Act is unconstitutional.
I. INTRODUCTION
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II. UTILITARIANISM AND THE MODERN DERIVATIVE-WORKS RIGHT.......... 742
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INTRODUCTION

Many, many men have been just as troubled morally and spiritually as you
are right now. Happily, some of them kept records of their troubles. You'll
learnfrom them-if you want to. Just as someday, if you have something to
offer, someone will learn something from you. It's a beautiful reciprocal
arrangement.
-The

Catcher in the Rye'

A young Holden Caulfield received this advice from Mr. Antolini, his
former English teacher, in J.D. Salinger's acclaimed masterpiece The Catcher
in the Rye ("Catcher").2 Salinger, writing in the late 1940s, was describing the
same phenomenon Zechariah Chafee identified only a few years earlier, that
there is no such thing as a wholly original thought-each "new" creation
owes a debt to the prior art.3 It is not difficult to imagine a young Salinger
penning these lines as a thinly veiled homage to his own influences.4 Over
the years, however, Salinger withdrew further and further from his formerly
active role in contributing to literary dialogue. 5 He became something of a

J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 246 (1951).
2. Id. Catcher has become one of the most influential and popular books in modern
literature. Time magazine's website, for example, included it in a list of the 1oo greatest Englishlanguage novels from 1923 to 2005. Lev Grossman & Richard Lacayo, All Time 1oo Novels, TIME,
http://www.time.com/time/200 5 /loobooks/the-complete_1ist.html
(last visited Oct. 24,
2010). More than half a century after its initial publication, it remains a staple of high-school
curricula across the United States. Jennifer Schuessler, Get a Life, Holden, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
200g, at WK 5 . Even today, readers purchase over 250,000 copies annually, and the total
number of copies in print has topped 65,ooo,ooo. The Catcherin the Rye, ABSOLUTE ASTRONOMY,
http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/TheCatcherinthe-Rye
(last visited Oct. 24,
i.

2010).

Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 511
3.
(1945) ("The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predecessors. 'A
dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself.'"). Legal
scholar and historian George Ticknor Curtis also observed this phenomenon in the original
edition of his treatise on copyright, the first comprehensive survey of U.S. copyright law.
GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT 240 (photo. reprint 2006)
(Boston, Charles C. Little &James Brown 1847).
4. Perhaps foremost among them was fellow literary giant Ernest Hemingway. While
serving in the U.S. Army in France during World War II, Salinger arranged to meet with
Hemingway, then serving as a war correspondent, to show Hemingway some of his work. Having
read it, Hemingway reportedly remarked, "Jesus, he has a helluva talent," then shot the head off
a nearby chicken with his sidearm. Jack Skow, Sonny: An Introduction,TIME, Sept. 15, 1961, at
84, 88, availableat http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/o,g 71, 9 3 8775,oo.html.
5. See Complaint at 4, Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 20og) (No. og
Civ. 5095), 2009 WL 1529592 ("Salinger published actively from 1940 through 1965, and has
not published any new works since that time.").
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recluse, emerging from his solitude only to battle, all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court if need be, for protection of his intellectual property.6
In 2009, Fredrik Colting, then a relatively unknown author, announced
plans for U.S. publication of a work titled 6o Years Later.-Coming Through the
Rye ("6o Years Late?').7 Several characters and scenes, the setting, the
plotline, and even some of the language of Colting's novel all bear distinct
similarities to Salinger's iconic work.8 Immediately upon learning of
Colting's intentions, Salinger took action to stifle the work's publication,
eventually filing a complaint against 'John David California" (Colting's
pseudonym).9 Referring to Colting's work as "a rip-off pure and simple," the
complaint alleged that 6o Years Later infringed on Salinger's copyrighted
material.' 0 On July 1, 2009, the district court granted a preliminary
injunction banning publication of 6o Years Later in the United States."
While awaiting the Second Circuit's decision on Colting's appeal, Salinger
passed away.' 2 His estate continued to pursue the litigation and received a
generally favorable ruling from the Second Circuit on April 30, 201o.'3
Bringing such an action was characteristic of Salinger; he successfully
halted broadcasting of a BBC television program that included a screen

6. Jenny Booth, JD Salinger Sues over Unauthorised Sequel to Catcher in the Rye, TIMES
ONLINE (June 2, 2009), http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts-and-entertainment/
books/article641528I.ece.
7. Hack Behind 'Catcher"Flap, SMOKING GUN (June 10, 2009), http://www.thesmoking
gun.com/archive/years/2oog/o61oogsalingeri.html. Colting is a Swedish author whose
previous works include The Macho Man's (Bad)Joke Book, The Erotic A-Z and a listing of the ioo
best heavy-metal albums of all time. Id.
8. Compare JOHN DAVID CALIFORNIA, 6o YEARS LATER: COMING THROUGH THE RYE 24
(2009) ("I keep my eyes closed and think about all the madcap stuff that happened to me
around last Christmas, before I got so run down I had to come out to this place to rest."), with
SALINGER, supra note I, at 3 ("I'll just tell you about this madman stuff that happened to me
around last Christmas just before I got pretty run-down and had to come out here and take it
easy.").
g. Complaint, supra note 5, at 12 ("As soon as Salinger learned of the existence of the
unauthorized Sequel through his literary agents on or about May 14, 2009 ... he took action to
have its publication stopped.").
1o. Id. at 2.
it.
Salingerv. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68
(2d Cir. 2010).
12. David Lat,J D. Salinger, RIP., ABOVE L. (Jan. 28, 2010, 1:38 PM), http://abovethelaw.
com/2olo/o/plaintiffjdsalingerrip.php. Salinger died on January 27, 2010 at the age of
ninety-one. Richard Lacayo, JD. Salinger Dies: Hermit Crab of American Letters, TIME (Jan. 29,
20o), http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/o,8599,1957492,oo.html.
13. The Second Circuit held that the lower court erred by applying the wrong standard for
granting preliminary-injunctive relief. Salinger,607 F. 3 d at 84. It did, however, note that "there
is no reason to disturb the District Court's conclusion as to the factor it did consider-namely,
that Salinger is likely to succeed on the merits of his copyright infringement claim." Id. at 83.
Unfortunately, in remanding the case to the district court for reconsideration under the proper
standard, the appellate court did not address the flaws in the lower court's opinion that this
Note primarily addresses.
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adaptation of Catcher and refused on numerous occasions to license the
novel to filmmakers.'4 Salinger went so far as to declare publicly and
expressly that he had never-and would never-publish or authorize any
new narrative involving Holden Caulfield.15 While his attempts to shield his
beloved character from external treatments were certainly understandable
(and perhaps even sympathetic), Salinger clearly abandoned the ongoing
exchange of free expression, the "beautiful reciprocal arrangement" he
once offered his most famous character as comfort in a confusing world.'
This Note examines the district court's decision in Salinger v. Colting
against the backdrop of the current dispute among scholars, judges,
publishers, and authors regarding whether the First Amendment should act
as a limit on copyright law. Ever-expanding copyright protections have
prompted this search for a restraint on constitutional copyright authority,'7
but courts have almost uniformly declined to apply direct First Amendment
scrutiny to the Copyright Act., 8 In the face of such resistance, it is perhaps
surprising that so few scholars have proposed-or even recognized-the
possibility that the promotion-of-progress requirement of the Intellectual
Property Clause ("IP Clause") in the U.S. Constitution'9 could (and should)
function as the primary constitutional check on congressional copyright
authority.20
Part II of this Note explores the utilitarian foundation of and
justification for U.S. copyright law and briefly examines the expansion of
copyright protections-focusing particularly on the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works. Part III considers the uneasy case for direct First
Amendment scrutiny as a means of restraining Congress's power to extend

15.

Complaint, supranote 5, at 10-11.
Id. at 1o.

16.

At the time of Salinger's death, he had published nothing in over forty years. Lacayo,

14.

supranote 12.

For a creative proposal in this vein, see Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright:
17.
Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (2010) (arguing that substantive due
process offers a solution for protecting downstream users' rights).
18.

See infra note 55 and accompanying text (examining courts' lack of receptiveness to

the free-speech critique of copyright).
19. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
20. Cf Alan E. Garfield, The Casefor FirstAmendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1169, 1173 (2007) ("Of course, courts could also use the Constitution's Copyright and
Patent Clause to prevent . .. abuse."). Professor Garfield recognizes that the IP Clause provides
a better foundation for deciding whether the duration of copyright is unconstitutional, but he
contends that the First Amendment is the superior alternative where "the primary concern is
with copyright's impact on speech." Id. Professor Dotan Oliar is a notable exception to this
general trend-after examining in extensive detail the Framers' intent regarding the IP Clause,
Oliar concludes that "the Progress Clause was intended as a limitation on Congress's power."
Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progressas a Limitation on
Congress'sIntellectualPropertyPower, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1845 (2006).
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the Copyright Act. Recognizing that the IP Clause should impose internal
constitutional restraints on the scope of the Copyright Act, Part IV proposes
that the promotion-of-progress requirement presents a superior alternative
to the First Amendment as a tool for confining statutory copyright
protections to those that serve copyright's utilitarian objectives. Part V
extends this analysis to situations like that presented in Salingerv. Coltingand
maintains that, where a secondary author raises an as-applied constitutional
challenge to the Copyright Act under an internal-limits theory, the court
must decide whether that application of the Act will satisfy the promotion-ofprogress requirement-and that this is frequently not the case in derivativeworks actions. Part V concludes by proposing several factors for courts to
consider in ruling on such a challenge.
II. UTILITARIANISM AND THE MODERN DERIVATIVE-WORKS RIGHT
This Part briefly examines the history of-and particularly the
justification for-copyright laws in the United States. Since the U.S.
Constitution mandates a utilitarian purpose, decisions regarding the scope
of copyright protections demand an answer to the question of whether a
particular aspect of the Copyright Act will produce a net societal benefit of
the sort contemplated by the Framers. Thus, this Part concludes by applying
basic economic analysis to derivative-works right and arguing that, in light of
the utilitarian purpose required by the IP Clause, copyright's grant of that
right to authors is particularly problematic.
A.

THE UTILIARIAN FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. COPYRIGHTLAW

Modern U.S. copyright law traces its roots to the Statute of Anne,
enacted in England in 1709.

Its early development traced a course similar

to that of the English copyright system: enactment of a copyright act,
followed by a high-court decision that addressed the issue of whether, under
the act, authors retained any natural or moral rights in their works.2 2 In
England, the case was Donaldson v. Beckett 23 in the United States, it was
Wheaton v. Peters.2 4 In Donaldson, the House of Lords held that a common-law
copyright had existed before, but was divested by, the Statute of Anne. 25 The
Wheaton Court, however, steered U.S. copyright law in a different direction,
holding that Congress, by enacting the Copyright Act, created-rather than

Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT's HIGHwAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
22.
JUKEBOX 40 (rev. ed. 2003).
23.
(1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
2 1.

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
25. Donaldson, i Eng. Rep. at 843. Donaldson effectively overruled Millar v. Taylor, (1769)
98 Eng. Rep. 201 (KB.), a King's Bench decision holding that a perpetual copyright existed at
common law. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 1.13.1.2, at 1:31-33 (3d ed.
Supp. 2oo6).
24.
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merely secured-a purely statutory copyright for authors.26 As the Court has
subsequently noted, "The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the
labor of authors."2 7 Rather, it is to incentivize artistic creation in order to
promote the public good.28 Copyright law achieves this goal through
securing (for a limited time) an economic return for the author.2 9
Adopting utilitarianism as a founding premise for copyright law is not
without its drawbacks, however. Unlike a natural-rights-based regime,
utilitarianism entails applying a cost-benefit analysis to each decision about
whether to extend copyright protections to new types of original works, or to
newly valuable secondary uses of original works.30 Throughout the history of
U.S. copyright law, though, Congress has gradually-but steadily-increased
the exclusive rights available to copyright holders without properly
performing the cost-benefit analysis required by the utilitarian function
copyright law should play in society.3' In 1976, as part of its most sweeping
expansion of copyright law, Congress condensed the several previously
distinct adaptation rights into one blanket right "to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work."32
B.

THE EcoNoMIcs OF COPYRIGHT'S DERIVATIVE-WORKS PROTECTION

A cost-benefit analysis of statutorily extending the Copyright Act to
include a derivative-works right begins with the premise that, from a
utilitarian perspective, extending copyright law is justifiable only to the
extent that additional protection is necessary to incentivize additional
creative activity.33 By requiring secondary authors to receive permission to
build upon previous works-thereby increasing the cost of acquiring the raw

See Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 661 ("Congress, then, by this act, instead of sanctioning
created it."); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, § 1.13.2.2, at 1:36 ("Wheaton v.
Peters definitively rejected natural rights as copyright's founding premise . . . ."). See generallyJed
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 12 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (2002)
("[T] he official account of copyright law is that copyright is a solely statutory creation . . .
27. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
26.

an existing right ...

28.

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)-

See id. ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
author's creative labor." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, § 1.13.2.3, at 1:37. Goldstein, a supporter of the
30.
utilitarianism theory of copyright law, does, however, admit that "[u]tilitarianism has worked
better in theory than in practice." Id.
Compare Copyright Act of 1856, ch. 169, 1 1 Stat. 138, 139 (adding public-performance
31.
right in dramatic works), with Copyright Act of 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481, 481-82 (same for
musical works), Copyright Act of igog, Pub. L. No. 60-849, § 5(c), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (same
for works prepared for oral delivery), and Copyright Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-575, 66 Stat.
752 (same for nondramatic literary works).
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §i o6(2), 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as
32.
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006)).
29.

33. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1197, 1213
(1996).
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material needed to create new works-copyright law necessarily discourages
some creative activity.34 Thus, even putting aside problems like the
deadweight losses associated with monopolies35 and the inefficiencies
caused by risk-averse market participants,3 6 imposing transaction costs on a
wider base of secondary authors amplifies the likelihood of copyright-related
market failure. 37 This is because incremental increases in copyright

34.

See Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271,

1277-79 (2008). Cotter notes that, in a transaction-cost-free world, when a secondary user of

copyrighted material values using the original work more than the primary author values
excluding the use, the Coase Theorem-which holds that, given a situation presenting low
transaction costs, parties will settle disputes-suggests that the two would enter into an
agreement allowing the use for a fee. See id. at 1277. In reality, however, transaction costs often
operate to discourage otherwise-efficient uses. Id.
35. To some degree in the real world, profitable firms can set prices at a level above their
marginal costs, an ability referred to by economists as "market power." MAssIMo MOTrA,
COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 40-41

(reprt. 2005). A monopolist, however,

exerts maximum market power, which in turn allows it to set prices far in excess of marginal
costs. Id. at 41. Since demand is very rarely, if ever, perfectly inelastic, some consumers will
respond to the higher price by substituting away from the monopolized product. Because
exercising market power to raise prices dissuades consumers who value the product at a price
higher than its marginal cost of production but lower than the monopoly price, a market failure
known as a "deadweight social loss" occurs. See CLEM TISDELL & KEITH HARTLEY,
MICROECONOMIC POLICY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 195-98 (2oo8) (noting this impact on resource

allocation as one possible inefficiency caused by monopolies). Put another way, a deadweight
loss occurs because the "consumers' losses outweigh the monopolist's gain[s]." E-mail from
Thomas F. Cotter, Professor of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., to author (Feb. 3, 2010, 17:41
CST) (on file with author). The exclusive rights granted to copyright owners being a form of
monopoly, copyright law also runs the risk of producing deadweight losses. Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Foreseeabilityand Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1577-78 (2009).

36. If both copyright holders and secondary users were equally risk-averse, the
implications for copyright policy would (and should) presumably be negligible. However, this is
likely not the case-downstream users are disproportionately individuals, whereas copyright
owners tend to be firms. See Cotter, supra note 34, at 1312. Since firms interact with the market
through fiduciaries acting on behalf of diversified stockholders, they are, at least theoretically,
risk-neutral as to the possibility of copyright-infringement litigation. Id. ("[Blasic capital market
theory would say that if . . . firms' managers act as fiduciaries for well-diversified stockholders,
then the firms should be risk-neutral regarding the litigation." (quoting Jeremy Bulow, The
Gaming of PharmaceuticalPatents, in 4 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE EcONOMY 145, 162 (Adam B.

Jaffe et al. eds., 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given the inherent uncertainty
created by core copyright doctrines, downstream users-more risk-averse than the corporate
institutions that own large numbers of copyrights-are more likely to attempt to license or
refrain from using primary works, even where both options are inefficient. SeeJames Gibson,
Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, s 16 YALE L.J. 882, 887-95 (2007)
(arguing that this imbalance creates a "doctrinal feedback" loop that results in constant,
unconscious expansion of copyright protections); cf Matthew J. Baker & Brendan M.
Cunningham, Court Decisions and Equity Markets: Estimatingthe Value of Copyight Protection,49 J.L.
& ECON. 567, 582-84 (2006) (demonstrating empirically that legal changes-both statutory
and in case law-that broaden copyright protection correlate with increasing firm profits, while
those that narrowcopyrights correlate with decreasing profits).
37. See Sterk, supra note 33, at 1207. As Professor Sterk states:
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protection will eventually discourage the aggregate production of new
works.38
Modern copyright law's grant of a blanket derivative-works right is
particularly problematic in this regard. The main argument for this
expansion of copyright protection-though often presented in frustratingly
enthymematic form-seems to be that "the prospect of profits from
derivative works is necessary to create adequate incentives for production of
the original." 39 This premise would only hold true, however, where the
projected economic gain from the original work is less than its production
costs, and the additional projected gain from the derivative work is large
0
enough to compensate the author for the costs of producing both works.4
In cases where the production costs of an original work tend to be relatively
low, as in writing a novel, these conditions would apply with less frequency.4'
Furthermore, a primary author may, for whatever reason, not intend to
produce her own derivative work(s) or license her exclusive derivative-works
right to others, even where it would be economically advantageous for her to
do so. 42 In such cases, it cannot be said that the exclusive right to prepare

At some point, giving authors additional copyright protection will reduce the
supply of new works because the number of marginal authors deterred from
creating by the high cost of source material will exceed the number encouraged to
create by the increased value of a work associated with a marginal increase in
copyright protection.
Id. If, for instance, Congress were to drastically increase the duration of copyright protection,
the marginal benefits of such legislation would almost certainly fall short of its adverse effect on
the public domain. Id. at 1207-o8.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1215. Sterk notes an additional economic argument for derivative-works
protection-that allowing a single party to own both the original work and all potential
derivatives allows for efficient coordination. See E-mail from Stewart E. Sterk, Professor of Law &
Acting Dir. of the Intellectual Prop. Law Program, Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, to author
(Feb. 3, 2010, 07:33 CST) (on file with author). Essentially, the contention is that if everyone
could produce derivatives, it is possible that no one would do so because each potential
producer would face the possibility of competition from other potential producers. Id. This
argument is susceptible to at least two objections, however. First, it is not clear that the
possibility of competition will entirely stifle the production of derivatives. On the contrary,
competition tends to produce the opposite effect-if it did not, the entire body of antitrust law
would require, at the very least, a massive overhaul. Second, although it may fare better as a
generalized objection, the argument would be irrelevant when applied to situations where the
primary author has no intention to, and in fact does not, produce any derivative works.
40. See Sterk, supra note 33, at 1215-16 (questioning the efficiency of the derivative-works
right and noting the two conditions, set forth above, that must be present for its efficient
operation).
41. Of course, in cases where production costs are very high, such as filming a Hollywood
blockbuster, these conditions would often be met.
42. See Christine M. Huggins, Note, The Judge's Order and the RisingPhoenix: The Role Public
Interests Should Play in Limiting Author Copyrights in Derivative-Work Markets, 95 IOWA L. REV. 695,
716 (2010) ("[Copyright's] utility-maximization model often fails because new authors often
do not have the financial backing to pay for the use and copyright-holders hold out from selling
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derivative works provided the economic incentive for her creation of the
primary work. 43
In arguing for maintaining a strong derivative-works right, Professor
Michael Abramowicz presents a subtle, yet-at least initially-compelling
argument. 44 He uses product-differentiation theory, a tool that allows
economists to analyze the entry of producers into imperfectly competitive
markets (a category into which most copyrighted works fall), to argue that
relaxing the derivative-works right may produce "excessive entry
incentives."45 Under product-differentiation theory, the harm posed by
excessive market participants is the opportunity costs society as a whole
6
incurs as a result of the participants' entry into the relevant market.4
Despite its utilitarian foundations, however, copyright law is not directly
concerned with maximizing overall social utility, but with promoting
"Progress" in the creative arts. 47 It follows that the potential social harm that
could arise from (to borrow Abramowicz's example) a potential chef
choosing instead to write a cookbook is not a harm that copyright law should
contemplate-it should, in fact, prefer the cookbook.
Congress's grant to authors of a broad, exclusive derivative-works right
tends to expand copyright holders' monopolistic control without creating
offsetting economic incentives for additional creative output.48 Stated
simply, giving this right to authors costs more than it is worth. This
inefficiency, contrary as it is to copyright's utilitarian foundations, has
9
contributed to scholars' growing discontent with U.S. copyright law.4
these use-rights for noneconomic reasons."). Huggins concludes that either a liability regime or
using antitrust law's definition of market harm (in the context of fair-use analysis) would
produce greater utility in the realm of copyright law. Id. at 722.
43. See infra Part VA.2 (arguing that noneconomic incentives should not-and cannotjustify expanding copyright law to provide an exclusive derivative-works right). See generally
Cotter, supra note 34, at 1298 (noting the possibility of a "class of cases in which copyright
owners threaten to turn the copyright system on its head by using copyright as a tool of
censorship rather than for promoting robust debate"); Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding
Natural Monopoly, Deregulation, and Intellectual Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1164 (noting
that copyright-bargaining failures may be a function of the copyright owner inflating the value
of licensing his work).
44. Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright's Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90
MINN. L. REv. 317, 331-32 (2005)-

45. Id. at 344.
46. Id. at 345. These costs would arise from the inefficiencies that would ensue from
individuals whose time, talent, and energy would be more productively spent elsewhere
pursuing the creative arts instead. A high-school senior who excels in physics and mathematics
but has an atrocious singing voice, for example, would likely produce more societal wealth by
pursuing an engineering degree than by moving to New York and trying to land a record deal.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48. Sterk, supranote 33, at 1217.
49. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 26, at 58 ("Current copyright law is unconstitutional in
that it permits courts to issue injunctions or grant damages in cases of derivative works and live
performances."); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Modelfor Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in
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III. A TEMPEST IN A TEAPOT: THE UNEASY CASE FOR APPLYING
FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY TO COPYRIGHT LAW

In 1970, Melville Nimmer published a seminal article exploring the
relationship between the First Amendment and copyright law.5o Nimmer
concluded that copyright's internal "safety valves," particularly the ideaexpression dichotomy (and to some extent the limited duration of copyright
terms), ameliorate most potential conflicts with the First Amendment.5'
Other scholars, however, were not so certain-writing a year later, Lionel S.
Sobel warned of a gathering storm on the horizon, a "coming clash"
between the two bodies of law. 52 Now, almost forty years later, it is clear that
Sobel's forecast was correct. The debate over whether First Amendment freespeech principles should apply to copyright law has surfaced in a veritable
slew of publications,53 creating a "torrent of scholarship" and prompting
one professor's wry observation regarding the number of trees jurists have
destroyed in the process5'
Despite the continuing outcry from legal scholars, however, courts have
been reluctant to apply direct First Amendment analysis to copyright law-in
fact, most courts that have addressed the possibility of a conflict have
summarily dismissed it.55 As Paul Goldstein noted, the free-speech critique

Common with Anti-pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation,
42 B.C. L. REv. 1, 77 (2000) (concluding that a "speech-sensitive analysis" would make the
expansion of the Copyright Act to include an exclusive derivative-works right "look highly
suspect").
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranteesof Free Speech
50.
and Press?, 17 UCLAL. REv. 1180 (1970).
51.

Id. at 1192-96.

52. Lionel S. Sobel, Note, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19
COPYRIGHTL. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 8o (1971).
53. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, CopyrightHarm, Foreseeability, and FairUse, 85 WASH. U. L.
REv. 969, 99o (2007) ("[A]llowing a copyright owner to suppress criticism or expression of a
different viewpoint would be detrimental to First Amendment interests."); Mark A. Lemley &
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147,
165-72 (1998) (arguing that preliminary injunctions in the realm of copyright law are
unconstitutional "prior restraints" of free speech); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright
Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37-45 (2001) (arguing that courts should
apply First Amendment scrutiny to copyright law as a "content-neutral" speech regulation); L.
Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (1987) (arguing that
the evolution of modem copyright law, particularly the "corruption" of the fair-use defense,
"created a conflict between copyright and free speech rights"); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This
Essay: How FairUse Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 540
(2004) ("Copyright has always posed a potential conflict with the First Amendment.. .
54.

Garfield, supra note 2o, at 1169.
2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT

§ 10.3, at 1o:67 (2d ed. Supp. 2004). But see Twin
55.
Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that First
Amendment protections might supersede copyright's fair-use defense in an "extraordinary"
case).
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of copyright law has amounted to "a tempest in a very small teapot."56 Two
issues in particular render the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech
an uneasy candidate for a check on congressional copyright authority: (1)
the nature and structure of First Amendment protections, and (2) the
internal free-speech safeguards of the Copyright Act itself.
A.

PROBLEMS WITH CONSTRUCTING A EPAMEWORK FOR
FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY OF COPYRiGHT

The ever-expanding sphere of copyright law has undoubtedly
contributed to First Amendment concerns among scholars. Protection for
primary authors continues to grow to the perceived detriment of secondary
authors. As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the Copyright Act
undoubtedly suppresses no small amount of free expression.57 The nature of
copyright law, however, presents several potential problems for advocates of
applying free-speech analysis to the Copyright Act.
Perhaps most notably, copyright law does not seem to fit the
paradigmatic suppression of free speech contemplated by the First
Amendment, for it suppresses some speech (that of secondary authors) in
order to encourage the speech of others (primary authors). This facet of
copyright law makes it, at the very least, an unusual candidate for First
Amendment analysis.58 Copyright-infringement actions pit one speaker
against another, raising a difficult question: Whose free-speech rights should
prevail? In declining to apply direct free-speech scrutiny to the Copyright
Term Extension Act, the Court has expressed its view that the First
Amendment "bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other
people's speeches."5 9 Contemporary advocates for a free-speech critique, it
seems, face something of an uphill battle.
56.
57.

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 55, § 10.3, at 1o:67.
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 118 (2oo8). As Professor Netanel

notes:
Copyright is speech regulation. It touches directly and consistently on a broad
spectrum of speech, including literature, art, film, television broadcasts,
photographs, political polemic, model laws and regulations, original selections and
arrangements of data, and other such expression. Moreover ... copyright is heavily
involved in allocating speech entitlements among various speakers and categories
of speech.
Id. While Netanel contends that the free-speech-copyright paradox requires further inquiry, he
notes that some commentators conclude that, since the Copyright Act targets and restricts
speech, it violates the First Amendment. Id. For a fairly extreme example of this free-speech
attack on copyright, see Lemley & Volokh, supra note 53, at 186.
58. See David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate CopyrightPolicy, 65 U. PITr.
L. REV. 281, 300-01 (2004) ("[S]etting the First Amendment against copyright produces a
conflict between speech interests, rather than between speech and some other interest, such as
reputation or order. The First Amendment does not provide premises that can resolve such
conflicts.").
59.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
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Most would agree another potential problem is that copyright law and
the First Amendment are not entirely coextensive-the First Amendment's
protection of speech extends far beyond the scope of copyright law.60 The
6
subject matter of copyright law is constitutionally limited to "Writings" 1and
6
statutorily limited to works "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 2
The First Amendment, however, casts a much wider net, encompassing not
only actual speech, but also expressive conduct. 63 Furthermore, copyrights
are available only to "Authors"64 who engage in intellectual production of
original, creative works, 65 whereas the First Amendment requires neither
66
originality nor creativity for its protections to come into play. These
differences further hinder any attempt to apply direct First Amendment
scrutiny to the Copyright Act.
B.

THE COPYRIGHT ACT'S INTERNAL FREE-SPEECHSAFEGUARDS

The Copyright Act has internal mechanisms to ensure that it does not
overburden expression en route to promoting it. The most well known (and
most controversial) of these is the fair-use defense, a longstanding commonlaw doctrine that Congress codified in 1976.67 Fair-use analysis examines an
otherwise-infringing use of copyrighted material in light of four factors: (1)
"the purpose and character of the use"; (2) "the nature of the copyrighted
work"; (3) the amount of the copyrighted work used in relation to the entire
work; and (4) any effect the use may have on the potential market for the
copyrighted work.68 As the Court noted in Eldred v. Ashcroft, fair use is an

6o. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996). In
Bernstein, the court noted that "copyright and First Amendment law are by no means
coextensive," and that "the analogy between the two should not be stretched too far." Id.; see also
Dan L. Burk, PatentingSpeech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 126 (2000) ("[Tihe First Amendment clearly
protects some types of expression that the copyright statute does not cover."). But see Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F-3 d 65, 74 (2d Cir. iggg) ("We have
repeatedly rejected First Amendment challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement on
the ground that First Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair use
doctrine." (emphasis added)).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
62.
63. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) ("The First Amendment affords protection
to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.").
64. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
65. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
66. See Adrian Liu, Copyright as Quasi-public Property: Reinterpreting the Conflict Between
Copyright and the FirstAmendment, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383, 399 (2008)
("[Eldred] cannot be understood to introduce an originality requirement into the First
Amendment.").
67. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C.

68.

17

§ 107).

U.S.C. § 107.
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essential part of copyright's "built-in First Amendment accommodations." 69
The Court reasoned that fair use acts as such because it ensures that
downstream users may borrow copyrighted expression for purposes that
serve free-speech values particularly well (for example, scholarship or
parody).70

Additionally, the Copyright Act provides that "[i]n no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea
... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work." 7 ' This is a codification of the familiar "ideaexpression dichotomy," identified by Nimmer as the crucial factor in
preserving copyright's constitutionality under the First Amendment. 72
Although Nimmer perhaps overstated the importance of the doctrine in this
regard, the idea-expression dichotomy is undoubtedly at least part of the
"traditional contours" of copyright on which the Eldred Court relied in
explaining its general disinclination to apply First Amendment scrutiny to
copyright law.73 As the Court explained, so long as copyright law remains
within its traditional contours, it is at least capable of coexisting peacefully
with the First Amendment. 74
Scholars' persistence in the face of such steadfast judicial resistance to
First Amendment scrutiny of copyright law, as well as the myriad difficulties
inherent in constructing a workable framework for doing so, bring to mind
the old saying about "trying to fit a square peg into a round hole." Thus, it
comes as a surprise that legal scholars have largely neglected a less-tenuous
path to constitutionally restraining congressional copyright authority: the
internal limits imposed by the IP Clause itself.75
IV.

THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: INTERNAL LIMITS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT LAW

Recognizing that several separate bodies of copyright law would be
problematic, the representatives at the Constitutional Convention

69.

537 U.S. 186,

70.

Id.

71.

17U.S.C.§102(b).

219 (2003).

See Nimmer, supra note 5o, at 1192 ("I would conclude that the idea-expression line
represents an acceptable definitional balance as between copyright and free speech interests.").
See generally id. at i 18-3 (discussing the idea-expression dichotomy).
73. See 537 U.S. at 219 (stating that the idea-expression dichotomy acts as "a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act" (quoting Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
74. Id. at 221. The Court prefaced this statement by noting that the close temporal
proximity between the adopting of the IP Clause and the First Amendment "indicates that, in
the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles."
72.

Id. at 219.

75.

As another time-honored maxim states, "There's more than one way to skin a cat."
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unanimously and without debate voted to incorporate a clause into the U.S.
Constitution giving Congress the power "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
6
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."?
The Supreme Court has suggested that this language should act as a
limitation requiring copyright legislation to promote progress in the creative
arts. 77 Thus, the IP Clause itself arguably contains an internal purposive
8
limit on Congress's authority to enact copyright laws.7
Congress waited less than three years to pass federal copyright
legislation, modeled on its British predecessor, the Statute of Anne.79 As
evidenced by its title ("Act for the Encouragement of Learning"), the Statute
of Anne clearly had a utilitarian purpose-to encourage learning.so The title
of the first U.S. Copyright Act ("An Act for the Encouragement of Learning,
by Securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and
Proprietors of such Copies, During the Times Therein Mentioned")
evidenced a similar purpose.8 ' Unlike the Statute of Anne, however, the U.S.
Copyright Act's intended goal arose not only from practical concerns, but
also a constitutional mandate-the internal promotion-of-progress language
of the IP Clause. This Part begins by closely examining this constitutional
language and its implications. It concludes by arguing that the phrase was
intended to, and should, function as a limitation on Congress's authority to
enact copyright laws.
A.

PROMOTION OFPROGRESS AND THE "ENGINE OFFREEEXPRESSION"

"Progress" in the constitutional context is not a clearly defined concept,
and it would be neither easy nor straightforward to establish a precise

U.S. CONST. art. s, § 8, cl. 8; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, § 1.13.2.1, at 1:34
76.
(describing the inclusion of the IP Clause in the Constitution); see alsoTHE FEDERALIST NO. 43,
at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The States cannot separately make
effectual provision for either [copyrights or patents], and most of them have anticipated the
decision of this point by laws passed at the instance of Congress."). In the vernacular of the late
eighteenth century, "Science" was the domain of copyright, and patent law encompassed the
"useful Arts." GOLDSTEIN, supranote 22, at 41.
77. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). Referring to the
constitutional grant of power to Congress under the IP Clause, the Court stated, "This qualified
authority, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the
English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the 'useful arts."' Id. While the
Graham Court was addressing a question of patent law, it noted that the IP Clause splices patent
and copyright law together-thus, the Court declined to specifically address copyright law only
because the proceedings at bar did not raise copyright issues. See id. at 5 n. 1.
78. While the IP Clause also internally limits copyright protection to "Writings," "Authors,"
and "limited Times," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, this Note focuses on the "promotion-ofprogress" requirement.

79.
8o.

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2 5 , § 1.13.2.1, at 1:34.
Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).

81.

Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
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definition.82 Given, however, the Eldred Court's statement that the purpose
of copyright law is to encourage free expression,83 it follows that "Progress"
in copyright law necessarily involves free expression. The word itself traces
its etymology to Latin roots: the prefix "pro," meaning "forward," and the
word "gradi," meaning "to walk, take steps."8 4 Thus, the modern definition
of progress is "a forward or onward movement (as to an objective or to a
goal). "%8Even a priori, it stands to reason that free expression can move
forward only when something new is expressed, and in the realm of
copyrights, that "something" must take the form of an original work fixed in
a tangible medium of expression.86 Copyright law economically incentivizes
the expression of such works by granting to their authors an exclusive
reproduction right (for a limited time). 87
This understanding of progress explains the Court's description of
copyright as part of the "engine of free expression."8 8 Professor Malla
Pollack reached a similar conclusion in her examination of the historical
implications of the IP Clause, explaining that the Framers likely intended
"Progress" in the context of copyright law to equate with "dissemination." 89
Without dissemination of new works, the engine of free expression runs out
of fuel.
B.

PROMOTION OF PROGRESSAS A LIMITATION ON
CONGRESSIONAL COPYRIGHT AUTHORTY

It is clear that the Framers intended copyright law to promote free
expression. A core question remains, however: Is the "Progress" language of
the IP Clause a limitation on Congress's authority or merely an explanation
of the Framers' rationale for granting that authority? The Court has
repeatedly identified the constitutional purpose of copyright law as the

82.

Oliar, supra note 2o, at 1836.

83.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
STEVEN ScHwARTZMAN, THE WORDS OF MATHEMATICS: AN ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY
OF MATHEMATICAL TERMS USED IN ENGLISH 173 (1994); cf WEBSTER'S COMPLETE DICTIONARY
84.

OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 583 (Chauncey A. Goodrich et al. eds., London, George Bell &
Sons, 186o ed. 1886) (defining, under the entry for "gradient," the Latin word "gradi"as "to
step, to go").
85. Progress, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/progress
(last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2oo6) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .").
87. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'").
88. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
89. Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed To Promote?: Defining "Progress" in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution,or Introducingthe ProgressClause, 8o NEB. L. REV.
754, 756-58 (2001).
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promotion and creation of free expression,90 going so far as to state that
"Congress in the exercise of the patent [or copyright] power may not
overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor
may it enlarge the patent [or copyright] monopoly without regard to the
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby."9' Although the
textual uniqueness of the IP Clause has created some controversy over
whether its stated purpose was indeed a functional limitation on
congressional copyright authority,92 both the foregoing statement by the
Court and exhaustive historical research indicate that the Framers intended
it to act as such.93 The IP Clause does not grant Congress plenary power to
enact copyright laws; rather, such laws are constitutional only insofar as they
promote "Progress"-and "Progress" means the dissemination of original,
expressive works. 94
V.

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE
INTERNAL LIMITS ON CONGRESSIONAL COPYRIGHT
AUTHORITY TO SALDVGER V. COLTING

Since, as discussed above, courts have steadfastly refused to apply direct
First Amendment scrutiny to the Copyright Act, a derivative author in
Colting's position would be well-advised to seek a defense instead in the
internal limits of the IP Clause, which provide a more ready framework for
constitutional review of copyright law.95 As an initial matter, such an author
6
would likely raise an as-applied, rather than facial, challenge.9

go.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.

Graham v.John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966). Although addressing
a question of patent law, the Court noted that the same clause grants Congress constitutional
authority to enact both patent and copyright laws. Id. at 5 n. 1.
Compare Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1g81) (rejecting the
92.
argument "that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on
congressional power"), with Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6 (accepting same). See generally, e.g., Dan T.
Coenen & Paul J. Heald, Means/Ends Analysis in Copyright Law: Eldred v. Ashcroft in One Act, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 99, 105-o6 (2002) (referring to the preambulatory language of the IP Clause
as "striking," and noting that it is the sole constitutional clause "structured in this sort.of way");
Lawrence B. Solum, Congress'sPower To Promote the Progressof Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1, 20 (2002) (observing that the structure of the IP Clause is "unique among the
powers granted by the eighth Section of the first Article").
Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6; Oliar, supra note 2o, at 1788-803, 181o-12.
93.
94. As Professor Oliar aptly notes, "'Progress,' of course, is not a clearly defined concept,"
and it would be neither easy nor straightforward to establish a precise definition. Oliar, supra
note 20, at 1836. This Note, however, accepts the Eldred Court's statement that the purpose of
copyright law is to encourage free expression and roughly defines "Progress" as the continued
production and dissemination of creative, original expression, without inquiring as to the value
or worth of that expression.
95. See supra Part III (arguing that applying direct First Amendment scrutiny to the
Copyright Act would be problematic).
g6. This is because, unlike a facial attack, which "requires unconstitutionality in all
circumstances," an as-applied challenge requires parties to show only that the challenged
91.
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Unfortunately, the internal-limits road is the one less traveled. Colting
himself provides a telling example of this tendency: overlooking the
possibility of an internal-limits challenge, he raised the familiar First
Amendment argument as a defense to Salinger's lawsuit97-and lost. Thus,
derivative authors could assert that the Act's grant of an exclusive derivativeworks right to the primary author failed to promote the ex ante creation and
dissemination of new expressive works and that the Act is therefore
unconstitutional-at least as applied-under the "promotion-of-progress"
requirement of the IP Clause.98
A.

DERIVATIVE-WORKs RIGHTS ANDJ.D. SALINGER'S INCENTIVES To AUTHOR
THE CATCHER IN THE RYE

It stands to reason that, at least in the model situations the 1976 Act
presumably targeted, the exclusive right to prepare derivative works may
serve to incentivize an author to produce an original, creative work.99
Salinger's final lawsuit, however, presents a more problematic situation.
Having produced an original work, Salinger then steadfastly refused to
create any new derivative works of it for over fifty years. 10 0 In fact, his
complaint stated that Salinger had no intention to allow adaptations of any
of his works and alleged that he had "expressly and publicly stated" that he
has never allowed and will never allow any new narratives involving the
Holden Caulfield character.' 0 Colting raised the defense of fair use, 0 2
arguing (among other things) that his novel did not damage Catchers
derivative-works market. 0 3 The district court, however, rejected Colting's
fair-use defense' 0 4 and, holding that Salinger had presented a prima facie
case of copyright infringement, enjoined the publication of Colting's

statute was "at least unconstitutional in its particular application to them." City of Chi. v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 78 n.1 (999)

97.

(Scalia,J., dissenting).

Amended Answer & Counterclaim at 13, Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250

(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 5095 (DAB)), 200 9 WL 210

4

17.

g8. Direct copiers could raise similar challenges. As discussed above, however, the Act is
much more likely to fail to achieve its purpose in the realm of derivative uses than it is when
considering direct infringement of the primary work.
99. See generally Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 1o4th Cong. 55-57 (1995) (statements of Bob Dylan, Don Henley, and Carlos
Santana, among others, to the effect that the Act's grant of exclusive rights incentivizes their
artistic creations).
oo.

Lacayo, supra note 12.

Complaint, supra note 5, at o.
Amended Answer & Counterclaim, supra note 97, at 12.
103. Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Defendant asserts that
there is no evidence that 6o Years will undermine the market for Catcher or any authorized
sequel."), vacated, 607 F.3 d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
104. Id. at 268 (stating that the balance of the four factors expressed in § 107 weighed
against a finding of fair use).
101.

102.
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novel.' 0 5 Thus, the court's decision left the public with one novel where it
might have had two.
1. Salinger's Exclusive Right To Prepare Derivative Works
If this result seems odd in light of the foregoing constitutional analysis,
it should. As noted above, the right to prepare derivative works frequently
fails to promote progress.o6 Even if, on a macro level, the derivative-works
right promotes the creation and dissemination of new works, it does not
appear to have done so in this case.
Salinger's steadfast refusal to prepare or license any derivatives of
Catcher strongly indicates that the right to prepare derivative works did not
incentivize his creation of the novel. Furthermore, Salinger's production
costs of writing Catcherwere likely low in relation to his expected gains from
its publication. 0 7 And if that was in fact the case, then copyright protection
for Catcher (the primary work) was likely a sufficient incentive for Salinger to
write it. Unfortunately, a low production-cost-to-anticipated-profit ratio for a
primary work increases the likelihood of the derivative-works right
functioning as an entirely extraneous incremental expansion of copyright
law.ios
2.

Salinger's Exclusive Right Not To Prepare Derivative Works?

Perhaps more troubling, the district court, citing no precedential
support, raised the novel supposition "that authors might create out of a
desire to not license [or produce] derivative works."109 This reasoning
appears to stem from a misunderstanding of the nature of the interests that
fall within the purview of copyright law. It reflects the unfortunate
persistence of the "natural-rights" theory of copyright, 0 despite the Court's
repeated statements that the purpose of copyright law is not to protect
Id. at 269 ("Given the Court's finding that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of
105.
its Copyright claim, . . . the Court preliminarily enjoins Defendants from . .. disseminating any
copy of 6o Years or any portion thereof, in or to the United States.").
1o6. See supra Part II.B (providing an economic analysis of derivative-works right).
See generally Complaint, supra note 5, at 8 ("[Catcher] became a commercial and critical
107.
success soon after its release .. . and it has never lost that status.").
1o8. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the derivative-works right in light of copyright's utilitarian
purpose).
1og.
Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Ass'n et al. in Support of DefendantsAppellants & Urging Reversal at 26, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F. 3 d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. og2878-CV), 200 9 WL 686 5 3 21 at *26.
1o. The natural-rights theory of copyright bases itself on Lockean property theory,
particularly Locke's seventeenth-century notion that a man unquestionably owns his own
labor-thus, when he mixes it with some object, he acquires an inherent right to that object.
Sami J. Valkonen & Lawrence J. White, An Economic Model for the Incentive/Access Paradigm of
Copyright Propertization:An Argument in Support of the Orphan Works Act, 29 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J- 359, 363-65 (2007). Naturally, under this view, public-policy considerations should
not limit authors' rights in their works. Id. at 364.
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authors' natural or moral rights in their works, but to spur the dissemination
of new works."' Copyright law accomplishes this purpose through creating,
by way of a statutory monopoly, economic incentives for artists to create."' 2
It would strain the imagination to argue that Salinger had an economic
interest in refusing to produce or license derivative works of Catcher-he
realized no additional income and likely sustained substantial opportunity
costs by doing so."3 In fact, Salinger's own complaint admits that "[h]is
right not to publish a sequel is unquantifiable.""4 Thus, while artists who
create primary works may occasionally be motivated in part by a desire to not
license derivatives, essentially the very human desire to own a tableau frozen
in time and cordoned off from future artists-copyright law does not
recognize such a motivation as valid.
Tellingly, the district court reasoned that "U]ust as licensing of
derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation of originals,
so too will the right not to license derivatives sometimes act as an incentive to
the creation of originals.""5 While it is true that derivatives-licensing
revenues are "an important economic incentive,"" 6 it is equally true that a
"right" not to license or prepare derivative works would act merely as "an
incentive"-one that is decidedly not economic." 7 The district court rightly
demurred from labeling the incentives offered by this neoteric right not to
license as "economic,"" 8 but in doing so, the court highlighted the fatal flaw
in its logic. Since copyright law does not contemplate noneconomic motives
for disseminating original works,'9 courts should not allow authors like
111. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984)
("The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort."); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors.").
112. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas."); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
author's creative labor." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
113. Cf Complaint, supra note 5, at 11 ("Salinger's copyright in The Catcher in the Rye is
worth an enormous amount of money and his right of first publication of a sequel is likewise of
great monetary value.").
1 14.

Id.

115.

Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F-3d 68

(2d Cir. 2010).
1 16. Id.; cf supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting that the right to prepare
derivative works frequently serves as an economic incentive to the production of originals).
117. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (recognizing that authors may, and
sometimes do-for whatever reason-choose to act against their own best economic interest).
118. Salinger,641 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
i19. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas."). See generally 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
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Salinger to defeat constitutional challenges by arguing that a "right" not to
prepare derivatives incentivized them to produce their original works.
B.

THIs APPLICATION OFTHE COPYRIGHTACT WAS LIKELY UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Since copyright law does not recognize the exclusive right not to
prepare derivative works as a valid incentive, the Copyright Act in Salinger's
instance likely failed to serve its constitutional purpose. That purposeincentivizing the creation of original works of authorship-is the necessary
counterbalance to the harm to societal welfare inflicted by copyright
monopolies. Had Colting brought an as-applied constitutional challenge to
the constitutionality of the Act under the IP Clause, it should have
succeeded.
To further explain that fairly loaded statement, consider what occurred
in the sphere of constitutional law during this litigation. As applied to this
situation, the Copyright Act effectively banned a book from U.S.
distribution,12 0 and it did so without, in all likelihood, serving its
countervailing constitutional purpose. In fact, far from incentivizing the
creation and dissemination of new works, the Act-as applied-likely served
only to halt dissemination of a new work. Withholding new, creative works
from the public is the polar opposite of copyright's constitutional purposein a very real sense, the Salinger court shifted the engine of free expression
into reverse. The obvious objection is that Salinger could have changed his
mind at any moment and decided to prepare or license a derivative of
Catcher. However, copyright law deals with ex ante incentives;"' an ex post
decision to exploit the derivative-works market would not mean that the
Copyright Act promoted the creation of the original work within the
meaning of the IP Clause.
Thus, where a secondary author in a case like Salinger raises an asapplied constitutional challenge to the Copyright Act under an internallimits theory, the court should decide whether that application of the Act
fulfills copyright's constitutionally mandated purpose. This inquiry need not

NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 754 n.69 (photo. reprint 1981)

(R.H.

Campbell et al.eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1979) (1776) ("llf the book be a valuable one the
demand for it in [the period of copyright protection] will probably be a considerable addition
to [the author's] fortune." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although Smith was
commenting on the Statute of Anne, successive generations of scholars have likewise explained
U.S. copyright law's justification using economic theory. NETANEL, supra note 57, at 84.
Unfortunately, the copyright-as-incentive hypothesis largely continues to exist as just that-a
hypothesis-since "[d]efinitive empirical support for that intuition is difficult to come by." Id.
120. In discussing the power to grant injunctions in copyright-infringement suits, Judge
Kozinski goes so far as to state that "Congress has given courts the power to order books
burned." Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So FairAbout Fair Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT
SOc'YU.S.A. 513, 516 (1999).

See Balganesh, supra note 35, at 1589 (referring to authors' ex ante incentives to create
121.
as "the inducement that copyright is meant to be about").
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be as complex as it might, at first blush, appear. In fact, it boils down to the
question of whether the exclusive right to prepare derivative works
incentivized the original author to prepare and disseminate the original
work. 122
To determine an author's incentive, a court should consider several
factors. Initially, in inquiring into a primary author's ex ante incentives to
prepare her original work, the author's own statements on the subject
provide some guidance-and where the author has expressly stated that she
never had any intention to prepare a derivative work or allow others to do
so, it would be (at the very least) difficult for a court or jury to find that the
derivative-works right motivated her to create.' 2 3 Of further interest would
be the time that had elapsed between preparation of the original work and
the lawsuit-if lengthy, it would appear less likely that the primary author
placed high (or any) economic value on her exclusive derivative-works
right.' 24 Finally, where the production costs of preparing the original work
were low as compared to its projected returns, and the additional projected
gains from the derivative work were not necessary to compensate the author
for the costs of producing both works, the additional incremental protection
granted by the exclusive derivative-works right was not necessary to induce
the author to prepare the original work.25 In situations where each of these
elements exists, like that of Salinger, there is a high likelihood that the
Copyright Act, as applied, violates the constitutional promotion-of-progress
requirement of the IP Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION

The expansion of copyright law has troubled scholars for decades.
Although the artificial monopoly granted to primary authors by the
Copyright Act arguably does restrict the speech of secondary authors, the
Act's unique attributes and built-in free-speech safeguards make it an uneasy
122. Although defendants accused of direct copying could conceivably bring similar
constitutional challenges, they would be far less likely to succeed. As noted above, the
derivative-works right is uniquely problematic from copyright's utilitarian perspective. See supra
notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
123. Of course, the specter of perjury is ever-present where a witness stands to personally
benefit through disingenuous testimony. This problem is not unique to copyright law: "Truthful
testimony is essential to the administration of justice and the functional capacity of every
branch of government." Tristan S. Breedlove, Pejury, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 899, 899 (2009).
The threat of criminal prosecution under federal criminal statutes that punish false testimony is
Congress's response to "the 'pollution of pejury.'" Id. at goo (quoting Bronston v. United
States, 409 U.S. 352, 357 (1973)). This Note accepts that threat as an adequate deterrent to
perjurious primary authors.
124. Where an author (like Salinger) has neither prepared a derivative work nor licensed
his original work for over fifty years, it would seem quite difficult for a fact finder to conclude
that the derivative-works right incentivized his original creation.
125. Unfortunately, given the imprecise nature of the relevant calculations, this factor may
not (and probably should not) be as dispositive as a pure economic theorist would like.
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candidate for direct First Amendment scrutiny. The internal limits imposed
by the IP Clause present a more direct, workable alternative for applying
constitutional review to copyright-infringement lawsuits.
Where the Copyright Act fails to fulfill the purpose mandated by the IP
Clause-to incentivize the creation and dissemination of expressive worksit violates an internal, constitutional limit on congressional copyright
authority. Where a derivative-works author raises such a constitutional
violation as a defense against a copyright-infringement action, the court
should consider multiple factors in weighing the merits of the challenge,
including the author's testimony as to his ex ante motivations, any external
evidence regarding the same, and the relevant projected economic gains
and production costs. Although direct copiers could also raise such
challenges, the Act is much more likely to fail to achieve its purpose in the
realm of derivative uses-and it probably does so with some frequency in
cases like Salinger.
Like Holden Caulfield, many authors may feel that "[c]ertain things ...
should stay the way they are. You ought to be able to stick them in one of
those big glass cases and leave them alone."12 6 Unfortunately for those
authors, nostalgically yearning to keep their creations untouched forever,
Mr. Antolini's "beautiful, reciprocal arrangement" is not a one-way streetfor the engine of free expression to keep running, some characters have to
grow up.

126.

SALINGER, supra note i, at 158.
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